Continued reliance on outdated nuclear technology might not have the same crucial global technology spillovers as investments in other clean energy (including advanced nuclear). Since the best path towards global decarbonization is through global technology spillover into emerging economies, the actors that have the best emissions score may, surprisingly, not be the most effective actors at reducing the global rate of emissions in the future. This has some counterintuitive implications. Consider that Germany has higher carbon emissions than France even though it has invested more heavily in solar than its neighbor, which uses much more nuclear. Should advanced economies like Germany leave their nuclear plants running? Perhaps, but it will not make a very large dent in global emissions because 75% of all future emissions will come from emerging economies, which will not adopt the kind of (non-advanced) nuclear power currently in use in Germany. Consider that German citizens environmental footprints are currently less than 4% of the global total, a share that is on the decline.
Regarding the hypothetical that Germany should have first shut down its coal fired power plants, that could have created perverse incentives similar to what we're seeing in France, where the nukes require more and more money for emergency repairs and maintenance thus sucking up funds and opportunities from other projects. Political power (and funds) is limited, there's only so much you can do before you have to wait until the next elections/funding cycle.
Despite the limited success of the Energiewende, Germany now has only one way forward -- toward a renewables based energy system with flexible demand and supply. Compare that to France where edf is drowning in debt, gen. 3 reactors are unbuildable, old reactors are failing left-and-right, and at the same time the nuke interests are fighting tooth and nail renewable projects at every step.
we also need to acknowledge that the German coal Barrons fought back against Energiewende and not enough was done at a federal level by Merkel to break their stranglehold on power and decision making. their influence via the boards of banks and the shadow banking sector (finance) is not revealed publicly, they have have bank executives come out publicly defending coal rather than do it themselves. North-south transmission inteconnectors have been in the pre-planning stage for decades now.
Interesting reflection. Also good comment from Laurenz.
The end of baseline production in Germany is, in my opinion, conditioned by an end in the baseline production in its neighbouring countries. Otherwise they might start importing more (baseload), and their imports, particularly from France, Czech Republic, Poland, and Switzerland will provide the new German baseline mean of production.
You are redefining the meaning of Baseload. It is not a production feature but the base of the minimum load profile over a certain time period. There are plants that are designed to provide such load such as nuclear power plants. If you want to support your argument of decreasing BL you would need to look at hourly production patterns over the year and see what the minimum load is and has been historically. I doubt there is much change, if any, so the need to somehow provide baseload has not changed. Without classic BL providing sources you can generate a baseload production pattern with renewables + batteries + some CCGTs - and need to provide an economical business cases for all technologies - or you could in the future force consumption to follow generation patterns of intermittend PV and Wind sources only... But please don't sell it as consumer friendly progress :)
Would also be transparent if you would quantify carbon intensity in France vs Germany to support your argument that France is worsening and Germany is improving which might be true relatively but in absolut terms these countries CO2 intensity is different by an order of magnitute
Agree that France still spews much less than Germany, but the starting point for Germany was horrible (and decided at a time when carbon emissions was not a relevant criterion), and the two trends are quite different right now.
Regarding baseload, or minimum demand, it's just a theoretical concept. What matters is how to cate for ((demand - inflexible production)). The old solution was to minimize the necessary capacity for that (baseload does the minimal demand all the time, so you only need the difference). But that not necessarily the only, or the cheaper solution. If capacity is cheap, and generation is expensive (as for fossil fuel plants), it is possible to have more spare capacity, used little, for the moments when it's needed. No need to sacrifice consumers, just to provide a different model to power plants - effectively all gas-fired plants will be peakers rather than a combination of peakers and midload and even baseload plants.
And that's before e get to smart demand management, and interruptible industrial activity that uses ultra cheap surplus renewables profitably when it's there and switches off when it's not.
sector coupling will be the big winner for low emissions and lowering mean wholesale power prices when nations hit ~80% RE.
Just take a look at the Mark Jacobsen group's latest modelling for not just 100% RE but a 100% non-energy emissions economy modelled for every state in the USA. There's a nice synergy between electrification of industrial load, sector coupling for demand side flexibility and thermal storage when you get to high levels of RE penetration. Commercial interests will drive FF use out of every sector once industrialists see their competitors plants using low/zero-emissions technologies to do the same things they're doing with FF*. Consumer demand will force the recalcitrants.
Not that I'm glowing in a delusional cloud for the forces of competition (they're partly why in 30 years emissions have only gone up — including USA who merely offshore manufacturing emissions and used trick accounting that says methane is half the emissions of coal) , there needs to be a lot of cooperation, only together, politically and practically do we have much hope of getting the runaway emissions curve bent down to zero.
The most relevant part for me was "incumbent fighting tooth and nail" -- I understand there is a lot of money at stake and plenty of interests, but some of the reactions were disappointing nonetheless. Just an abundance of cheap half truths and manipulation. But I also agree it won't matter in the end.
Continued reliance on outdated nuclear technology might not have the same crucial global technology spillovers as investments in other clean energy (including advanced nuclear). Since the best path towards global decarbonization is through global technology spillover into emerging economies, the actors that have the best emissions score may, surprisingly, not be the most effective actors at reducing the global rate of emissions in the future. This has some counterintuitive implications. Consider that Germany has higher carbon emissions than France even though it has invested more heavily in solar than its neighbor, which uses much more nuclear. Should advanced economies like Germany leave their nuclear plants running? Perhaps, but it will not make a very large dent in global emissions because 75% of all future emissions will come from emerging economies, which will not adopt the kind of (non-advanced) nuclear power currently in use in Germany. Consider that German citizens environmental footprints are currently less than 4% of the global total, a share that is on the decline.
At one point, German subsidies drove ~⅓ of the global solar adoption, ~86% of which occurred outside Germany (6x) - see https://founderspledge.com/stories/changing-landscape#fnref1
Regarding the hypothetical that Germany should have first shut down its coal fired power plants, that could have created perverse incentives similar to what we're seeing in France, where the nukes require more and more money for emergency repairs and maintenance thus sucking up funds and opportunities from other projects. Political power (and funds) is limited, there's only so much you can do before you have to wait until the next elections/funding cycle.
Despite the limited success of the Energiewende, Germany now has only one way forward -- toward a renewables based energy system with flexible demand and supply. Compare that to France where edf is drowning in debt, gen. 3 reactors are unbuildable, old reactors are failing left-and-right, and at the same time the nuke interests are fighting tooth and nail renewable projects at every step.
we also need to acknowledge that the German coal Barrons fought back against Energiewende and not enough was done at a federal level by Merkel to break their stranglehold on power and decision making. their influence via the boards of banks and the shadow banking sector (finance) is not revealed publicly, they have have bank executives come out publicly defending coal rather than do it themselves. North-south transmission inteconnectors have been in the pre-planning stage for decades now.
interesting point, thanks
Interesting reflection. Also good comment from Laurenz.
The end of baseline production in Germany is, in my opinion, conditioned by an end in the baseline production in its neighbouring countries. Otherwise they might start importing more (baseload), and their imports, particularly from France, Czech Republic, Poland, and Switzerland will provide the new German baseline mean of production.
You are redefining the meaning of Baseload. It is not a production feature but the base of the minimum load profile over a certain time period. There are plants that are designed to provide such load such as nuclear power plants. If you want to support your argument of decreasing BL you would need to look at hourly production patterns over the year and see what the minimum load is and has been historically. I doubt there is much change, if any, so the need to somehow provide baseload has not changed. Without classic BL providing sources you can generate a baseload production pattern with renewables + batteries + some CCGTs - and need to provide an economical business cases for all technologies - or you could in the future force consumption to follow generation patterns of intermittend PV and Wind sources only... But please don't sell it as consumer friendly progress :)
Would also be transparent if you would quantify carbon intensity in France vs Germany to support your argument that France is worsening and Germany is improving which might be true relatively but in absolut terms these countries CO2 intensity is different by an order of magnitute
Agree that France still spews much less than Germany, but the starting point for Germany was horrible (and decided at a time when carbon emissions was not a relevant criterion), and the two trends are quite different right now.
Regarding baseload, or minimum demand, it's just a theoretical concept. What matters is how to cate for ((demand - inflexible production)). The old solution was to minimize the necessary capacity for that (baseload does the minimal demand all the time, so you only need the difference). But that not necessarily the only, or the cheaper solution. If capacity is cheap, and generation is expensive (as for fossil fuel plants), it is possible to have more spare capacity, used little, for the moments when it's needed. No need to sacrifice consumers, just to provide a different model to power plants - effectively all gas-fired plants will be peakers rather than a combination of peakers and midload and even baseload plants.
And that's before e get to smart demand management, and interruptible industrial activity that uses ultra cheap surplus renewables profitably when it's there and switches off when it's not.
sector coupling will be the big winner for low emissions and lowering mean wholesale power prices when nations hit ~80% RE.
Just take a look at the Mark Jacobsen group's latest modelling for not just 100% RE but a 100% non-energy emissions economy modelled for every state in the USA. There's a nice synergy between electrification of industrial load, sector coupling for demand side flexibility and thermal storage when you get to high levels of RE penetration. Commercial interests will drive FF use out of every sector once industrialists see their competitors plants using low/zero-emissions technologies to do the same things they're doing with FF*. Consumer demand will force the recalcitrants.
Not that I'm glowing in a delusional cloud for the forces of competition (they're partly why in 30 years emissions have only gone up — including USA who merely offshore manufacturing emissions and used trick accounting that says methane is half the emissions of coal) , there needs to be a lot of cooperation, only together, politically and practically do we have much hope of getting the runaway emissions curve bent down to zero.
The most relevant part for me was "incumbent fighting tooth and nail" -- I understand there is a lot of money at stake and plenty of interests, but some of the reactions were disappointing nonetheless. Just an abundance of cheap half truths and manipulation. But I also agree it won't matter in the end.